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ILLINOIS CHILD-CARE DISREGARD LITIGATION:
MODEST CONSOLATION FOR THE WORKING
POOR*
Diane Redleaf*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the largest sources of governmental funding for child
care is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram. The Social Security Act, which governs the AFDC program,
requires that every state allow working AFDC applicants and recip-
ients a deduction for child-care expenses in determining the amount
of the family's cash AFDC grant.' By means of this deduction, state
welfare agencies in effect subsidize the child-care costs of working
AFDC recipients.
The statutory requirement for the AFDC program's child-care
deduction is straightforward. Nonetheless, some states have circum-
vented the statutory mandate by paying illegally low child-care sub-
sidies or simply by ignoring the law.2 Litigation in several states has
been necessary to compel compliance with the Social Security Act.'
This article reviews two major federal suits in Illinois concerning the
AFDC child-care deduction.' The article also discusses some of the
policy questions raised by the use of the deduction and points out the
limitations of the deduction as a child-care funding mechanism.
0 1985 by Diane Redleaf
* The litigation discussed in this article was conducted by the Women's Law Project of
the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago. Aviva Futorian, the Director of the Women's
Law Project, was lead counsel in the Simpson suit. See infra note 4. The author, Diane
Redleaf, then a staff attorney in the Women's Law Project, was lead counsel in the Berberena
suit. See infra note 4.
Portions of this article originally appeared in the plaintiffs' briefs which are on file at the
Santa Clara Law Review Office.
** Diane Redleaf is currently the Director of the Children's Rights Project of the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago.
1. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7), 602(a)(8)(A) (1982).
2. Suits have been brought throughout the nation to challenge illegal AFDC-related
child-care deduction practices. See infra notes 3 and 21.
3. See Riemer v. Hooker, 392 F. Stipp. 145 (D.N.H. 1975); Banas v. Dempsey, 742
F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1984); Lowry v. Obledo, 111 Cal. App. 3d 14, 169 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1980).
4. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-
5776, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981).
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II. THE AFDC PROGRAM'S CHILD CARE MANDATE
A. AFDC Eligibility and Grant Amounts-General Requirements
AFDC is the largest public assistance program in the country.
Nationwide in 1982, approximately five and a half million families,
including 6,899,000 children received AFDC. The federal govern-
ment allocated nearly $8.16 billion in federal dollars for AFDC ben-
efits in 1985 to support eligible dependent children and their care-
taker relatives.6
The Social Security Act provides that AFDC eligibility is based
on two separate types of considerations: "categorical eligibility" and
"financial eligibility." Categorical eligibility focuses on whether the
household includes a child "deprived of parental support" (and thus
dependent) who is "living with a specified relative." 6 Financial eligi-
bility focuses on whether the household's income, after all allowable
deductions, falls below the state standard of need and payment level.'
If both types of eligibility considerations are satisfied, the child,
relative or family will receive cash assistance, usually in the form of
a monthly check issued by the state welfare department.8 In addition,
AFDC recipients are automatically entitled to Medicaid coverage.9
For many people, this Medicaid coverage is more valuable than the
small cash grant provided under the AFDC program.
The categorical and financial eligibility factors affect the availa-
bility of the child-care deduction or "disregard." In this context,
"disregard" and "deduction" are synonymous; disregarded income is
income which is subtracted from gross income, and thus it is not
counted-instead, it is "disregarded." The child-care disregard is
available only for specified relatives and children or persons living
with them. It is unavailable to the working poor whose income, even
with all allowable deductions, remains higher than the state's AFDC
payment level.
5. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET 1985. The Children's
Defense Fund has documented dramatic cuts in social programs, including AFDC, since 1981.
Statistics concerning the number of AFDC families are from child support caseload statistics.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 7TH AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 1982 62 (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(b)(ii) (1984).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7), (a)(8)(1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1984).
8. In some cases, the state will issue "protective payments" or vendor payments to per-
sons other than the AFDC recipient. 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2) (1982). The Dep't of Health and
Human Services recently proposed a requirement that vendor payments for the rent of AFDC
recipients be issued to landlords instead of being included as a portion of the AFDC grant. 45
C.F.R. § 234.60 (1984).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A) (1982).
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The AFDC program allows recipients to work; indeed, in 1972,
participation in work programs became mandatory for all nonex-
empt adults.10 In addition, the AFDC program requires applicants
and recipients to report all income, including income from employ-
ment, to the state public assistance agency.11 This income is then
counted in the amount of the family's "available income," which in
turn is counted against the AFDC payment level to determine the
amount of a particular family's grant.
To calculate available income, certain deductions or disregards
must first be applied to gross income. Prior to October 1, 1981, re-
cipients were entitled to deduct one-third of their gross income, plus
$30. This $30 plus one-third deduction is known as the "work-in-
centive disregard." At that time, applicants could also deduct all rea-
sonable work expenses, including child care.1 2 Effective October 1,
1981, however, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
made the work-incentive disregard available for only four months,
changed the order in which deductions were taken, capped work ex-
penses at $75, and created a separate work-related child-care deduc-
tion of $160 per child per month.1 The OBRA also allowed states
to set lower child-care deduction caps for part-time workers. 4 In
October 1984, the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) extended the $30
portion of the work incentive disregard for an additional eight
months. It also eliminated the states' option to set lower caps for the
work expenses of part-time workers, but did not change the option to
set lower child-care caps. 5
The effect of the OBRA and DRA changes is to discourage
AFDC recipients from working because they no longer recover their
full costs of employment. Thus, a recipient with gross income of
$600, child-care costs for one child of $200 and $80 for another
child, plus $100 in additional work expenses would have received the
$220 work-incentive disregard and $380 in work-expense deductions
prior to the OBRA. This recipient would have had zero available
income and thus would.have been eligible for a full AFDC grant.
After OBRA, however, the same recipient would have only $340 in
10. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1982).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(14)(A) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.28 (1984).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982).
13. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357-933 (1981)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(iii) (West Supp. 1981)).
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii) (1982); 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(11)(i)(C) (1984).
15. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2622-23, 98 Stat. 1134
(1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §602 (Supp. 1985)).
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work expense and child-care deductions, and only a $103 work in-
centive disregard for only four months. This recipient's AFDC grant
for the first four months after the OBRA would be $157 less than
the full grant; and after four months, it would be $260 less. If a
state's particular child-care deduction cap would pay this recipient
$400 if she stopped working, but only $140 if she continued to work,
she might well wonder if it pays to keep her job.
B. Work Expense Deductions Prior to October, 1981: General
Principles and Application to Child Care
Prior to October 1, 1981, the Social Security Act required that
"in determining need [for AFDC, the state welfare agency shall]
take into consideration . . .any expenses reasonably attributable to
the earning of such income. '"6 This law was consistently interpreted
to both prohibit states from establishing absolute maximums or other
limitations (apart from reasonableness) on work-expense disregards
under the AFDC program, and to apply to child-care expenses con-
nected with employment.
The United States Supreme Court, in Shea v. Vialpando," in-
terpreted the Social Security Act to prohibit a state from establishing
a maximum on the amount of work-related expenses which could be
disregarded in determining eligibility and computing benefit levels.
In concluding that a Colorado policy setting maximums for work-
related expenses violated the Act, the Court stated:
By its terms, [the Act] requires the consideration of "any" rea-
sonable work expenses in determining eligibility for AFDC as-
sistance . . . .[W]e read this language as a congressional direc-
tive that no limitation, apart from that of reasonableness, may
be placed upon the recognition of expenses attributable to the
earning of income. 8 . ..[Tihe Colorado regulation results in a
disincentive to seek or retain employment for all recipients
whose reasonable work-related expenses exceed or would exceed
that amount. Accordingly, the Colorado regulation conflicts with
federal law and is therefore invalid.'
The holding in Shea was consistently applied by other courts to pro-
hibit states from setting maximum disregards or maximum rates of
16. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1980).
17. 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
18. Id. at 260.
19. Id. at 265.
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reimbursement for AFDC recipients' work expenses.2" In addition,
courts have applied the holding of Shea to child-care expenses, thus
declaring that states must treat work-related child-care expenses like
other work-related expenses.21
Further support for the notion that child care is a work expense
can be found in interpretations by the Department of Health and
Human Services, then the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Under these interpretations, states were required to count
recipients' actual child-care expenses, "whether [those expenses
were] met as a disregarded amount of expenses of employment, or as
a special need item . . .or as a service met through vendor pay-
ment 2 2 or paid to the recipient .. 23
States were allowed to circumvent the deduction requirement,
however, by paying the recipient's child care expenses directly. In
Riemer v. Hooker,2" a federal court found such treatment permissible
as long as the state paid the full amount of the expenses and thereby
eliminated the need for the deduction.25
C. Work Expenses and Child'Care Expenses Under OBRA and
DEFRA
Effective October 1, 1981, the OBRA amended the Social Se-
curity Act to eliminate the need to deduct all reasonable work ex-
penses in order to calculate the amount of AFDC grants. Instead,
the OBRA set a $75 maximum on work expenses,26 and created a
20. See, e.g., Chambly v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 1221 (1979), affd, 624 F.2d 1108
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1401 (1981) (policies involving work-related food,
clothing, and transportation expenses); Fones v. Percy, No. 78-191, slip op. (W.D. Wis. Dec.
7, 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979) (transportation expenses); Perez v. Chang, 438
F. Supp. 238 (D. Hawaii 1966) (burdensome verification requirements for work-related ex-
penses involving meals, clothing, transportation, union dues).
21. See Schachter v. Percy, No. 80-223, slip op. (W.D. Wis. 1980) (maximum rates for
child-care reimbursements struck down, even though state allowed higher payments if special
circumstances shown); Godfrey v. Stanton, No. 75-50, slip op. (N.D. Ind. 1975) (child-care
maximum rates held invalid, even though state provisions allowed higher rates in "special
circumstances").
22. Special needs items are supplements to AFDC grants. Some states vary the total
AFDC grant according to the number of special needs. Vendor payments are payments to the
service provider directly, such as a direct payment for a recipients' rent to a landlord.
23. HEW Memorandum, PIQ 74-159 (October 29, 1974); HEW Memorandum, SFP
79-21 (August 15, 1979).
24. 392 F. Supp. 145 (D. N.H. 1975).
25. Id. at 147.
26. See Heckler v. Turner, 105 S. Ct. 2 (1984), which held that the $75 cap applies to
gross income, not net income, and includes mandatory tax withholdings. In short, no deduc-
tions for withholdings in excess of $75 are allowed, even though the withheld money is not
1985]
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separate deduction for child-care expenses. The OBRA provided that
state public assistance agencies "shall disregard from earned income
of any . . . individual . . . an amount equal to expenditures for care
in such month for a dependent child . . . requiring such care for
such month, to the extent that such amount does not exceed $160. ''27
The OBRA allowed states to set lower caps for child-care deductions
for part-time workers. Following the enactment of the OBRA, the
Department of Health and Human Services promulgated regulations
which required states to use the child-care disregard instead of mak-
ing special need payments or otherwise eliminating the expenses.2"
The OBRA also changed the order of the application of disre-
gards to reduce the effect of the work-incentive bonus. Instead of first
applying the "$30 plus one-third" disregard to gross income, the dis-
regard is applied after both the $75 work-expense deduction and the
$160 per child per month child-care deduction. This means the dis-
regard is applied to net income. The result is a smaller work-incen-
tive than previously was available. 9 Many recipients found they
were penalized for working when they lost the $30 plus one-third
deduction after four months, combined with the new caps on work
expenses. When their work expenses actually exceeded the caps and
each dollar they earned was counted against their potential grant,
many people found they would have more net income from AFDC if
they quit their jobs."0
Effective October 1, 1984, DRA again amended the Social Se-
curity Act to ameliorate some, but not all, of the penalizing effects of
available to the recipient. The Supreme Court in Turner reviewed the legislative history of the
Social Security Act and found that "earned income" referred to gross income. The Court noted
that Congress, in enacting the $75 cap, clearly intended to eliminate deductions for "all rea-
sonable work expenses, which include mandatory tax withholding. The Court explicitly re-
fused to comment on the "wisdom of the course Congress has set" in enacting the $75 cap. 53
U.S.L.W. at 4219.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii) (1982).
28. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(ll)(i)(B), (ii)(C) (1984).
29. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 10-20 for an example of why the
work-incentive disregard is now smaller.
30. The General Accounting Office reported that between 39% and 60% of working
AFDC recipients lost AFDC when the OBRA was implemented. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND REPORTS, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 2. There is a disincentive to
work because gross income rather than net income is now considered available, and the full
cost of working is not deductible. After the work-incentive disregard is lost, each dollar earned
is counted against a dollar in public assistance benefits. When work expenses and child-care
expenses exceed the statutory maximums, the full cost of working is not compensated by any
increase in the AFDC grant. Thus, those who work end up with less disposable income than
those who quit work and get a full AFDC grant. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND BUDGET 1985,
supra note 5.
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the OBRA. While the sequence of applying the disregards remains
the same as under the OBRA, the $30 portion of work-incentive dis-
regard now is available for twelve months and the full $75 work
expense deduction is available to part-time workers. However, states
can continue to set child-care disregards at less than $160 per child
per month for part-time workers. 31
III. NONCOMPLIANCE: THE PROBLEM IN ILLINOIS PRIOR TO
Simpson v. Miller 2 AND Berberena v. Miller
33
Despite the Social Security Act's clear mandate to require child-
care disregards for working AFDC applicants and recipients, several
states did not deduct these expenses. 4 In Illinois, the Department of
Public Aid (IDPA) treated child care as a "social-service" stipend
for which a special request was needed.35 The IDPA did not publi-
cize the availability of such social service stipends, however, and
often delayed its decisions on stipend requests. For those whose sti-
pend requests were approved, reimbursement for child-care expenses
was paid on a fixed schedule, depending on the type of care. This
reimbursement schedule provided for payments in Chicago of $0.88
per hour or $4.30 per day for babysitters in the recipient's home;
$6.01 per day or $132.22 per month for day-care homes; and $10.18
per day for licensed center care.3 6 These maximum rates applied no
matter how much the client actually spent on child care.3 7 No reim-
bursement was available for care provided by relatives living in the
child's home, even if these relatives had no legal responsibility to
care for the child.3 8 Finally, no reimbursement was provided for ser-
vices in day-care homes which were required to be licensed under
state law but which did not in fact have a license.3 9
Most AFDC applicants and cancelled recipients, who would
31. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2622-23, 98 Stat. 1134
(1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §602 (Supp. 1985)).
32. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
33. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776 slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981).
34. See cases cited supra notes 3 and 21.
35. Social service grants had to be requested by means of a social service request form.
Social service grants were available to cover some or all of the costs of homemaker services,
emergency caretaker services and other special needs of the AFDC family. See 45 C.F.R. §
1396.41(g)(3) (1980). In Illinois, a special unit separate from the AFDC caseworkers handled
social service requests and special forms were needed to make the request.
36. 11. Admin. Reg. § 5657, Rule 5.23 (1981).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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have been eligible for AFDC had their child-care expenses been de-
ducted from their income, did not receive any state assistance with
their child-care needs.40 Some of these people were referred to a sep-
arate state agency, the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS), for enrollment in the "transitional day care" (TDC) pro-
gram.4' If they followed up on this referral and became enrolled in
the TDC program, most of their child-care expenses were paid, ex-
cept that they were required to make a small co-payment.42 The
TDC program, however, only paid for care for 252 days per year
and would not reimburse unlicensed care. The program also delayed
enrollment and made no retroactive payments."3 Thus, many parents
who would have been eligible for AFDC with the child-care deduc-
tion had to absorb their own child-care costs for several months be-
tween the time they were denied or cancelled from AFDC and the
time they began receiving TDC payments.""
Neither the IDPA social service stipends nor the TDC program
were treated as an entitlement of the AFDC applicant or recipient,
but rather were treated as a special favor bestowed upon a special
request. Thus, very few people were aware of or made use of either
program."5 Only a very small percentage of the AFDC-eligible pop-
ulation received any reimbursement for their child-care expenses.
Lacking reimbursement, many AFDC recipients ended up making
"underground" babysitting arrangements with other AFDC recipi-
ents. The AFDC-recipient babysitters charged low rates and did not
report their child-care income to the welfare department or to the
Internal Revenue Service."" The state's failure to account for and
disregard child-care expenses thus fed a system of welfare fraud by
40. See infra text accompanying note 43.
41. The Transitional Day Care Program was a special child care payment program
developed in January, 1979 in response to Williams v. Quern, No. 77-4218 (N.D. III Nov. 14,
1977). Under an agreed order in that suit, IDPA established that a referral to DCFS could
take the place of a deduction for the plaintiffs child-care expenses and other work expenses.
No class was ever certified in Williams, even though the case was brought as a class action,
and no policy changes were incorporated into the IDPA manual for caseworkers.
42. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981).
43. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op., at paras. 27-29 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15,
1981).
44. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981).
45. In 1981, for example, only 1,497 of the 21,198 persons denied or cancelled from
AFDC were referred for enrollment in the TDC program. The entire TDC caseload in 1981
consisted of 1650 persons. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981)
(plaintiffs' memorandum in support of summary judgment at 11).
46. These arrangements were reported to plaintiffs' counsel at client meetings held in
September and October of 1982. Because the arrangements are "underground," no reported
statistics are available on the number of AFDC recipients who made similar accommodations.
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child care users and AFDC-recipient babysitters.
The biggest losers from the failure to deduct child-care expenses
were probably the AFDC applicants and cancelled recipients whose
child-care expenses were simply ignored when they were found inel-
igible for AFDC. These parents generally received no assistance
with their child-care expenses.47 By losing their entitlement to
AFDC benefits, these parents automatically lost Medicaid coverage
as well.4 8 Had IDPA deducted child care expenses in determining
AFDC eligibility, many women and children would have remained
AFDC-eligible and would have reaped the financial and medical
benefits that AFDC eligibility confers.
IV. Simpson v. Miller49 AND Berberena v. Miller:50 ILLINOIS
LITIGATION REMEDIES THE DENIAL OF CHILD CARE
DEDUCTIONS
A. The Two Complaints
On May 28, 1981, Karen Simpson and Diane Brooks filed suit
in the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging
the welfare department's failure to deduct their child-care expenses
when the department determined the amount of their AFDC
grants. 5' Karen Simpson worked part-time, received AFDC, and
spent $140 per month on child care. She did not get a social-service
stipend for her expenses or any deduction. Simpson's child-care pro-
vider was not required to be licensed.5' Diane Brooks worked, re-
ceived AFDC, and spent $86 per month on child care. Brook's child-
care arrangement was with a day-care home which cared for more
than three unrelated children, and thus was subject to Illinois' day-
care licensing law. Because the home Brooks used did not have a
license, Brooks could not obtain a social service stipend to meet her
child-care needs.58
Simpson and Brooks filed suit on behalf of themselves, on be-
half of their children, and, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a class of AFDC recipients.
47. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1981).
48. The General Accounting Office noted that in some parts of the country, 50% or 60%
of the families losing AFDC due to OBRA changes had no health insurance. CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND REPORTS, supra note 30.
49. 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
50. No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981).
51. 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981) (plaintiff's complaint).
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 6.
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The Simpson plaintiff class was defined as:
All AFDC recipients in Illinois . . . who, since April 1, 1980,
have been, are being, or will be employed and who have in-
curred, are incurring, or will incur reasonable employment-re-
lated child-care expenses . . . [which defendants have failed or
refused to reimburse, in their actual amount] prior to October 1,
1981), [and in their actual amount up to $160 per child per
month as of October 1, 1981]."'
The Simpson suit focused on the AFDC recipients' rights to higher
AFDC grants once child-care expenses were deducted.
Five months later, Dinorah Berberena and Rebecca Weaver
filed suit in federal court challenging the welfare department's fail-
ure to deduct their work-related expenses in a different determina-
tion-whether they were initially eligible for AFDC.55 Dinorah
Berberena was cancelled from AFDC in September, 1981. At that
time, her child-care expenses were $309.96 per month and included
$86 for one child who used a babysitter and $223.96 for another
child who used licensed center care. Had her September, 1981 child-
care expenses been deducted from her income, as legally required,
she would have remained AFDC-eligible.5 6 Instead of receiving a
deduction, however, two weeks after she received her AFDC cancel-
lation notice, Berberena was referred to the Transitional Day Care
(TDC) program administered by Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS). The TDC program required that she
make co-payments for her child care and would not pay for any care
during October. In addition, the program would not pay Berberena's
$86 per month babysitting bill because the babysitter was not li-
censed.57 Rebecca Weaver, who spent $129 per month for child care
in an unlicensed day-care home, was cancelled from AFDC in Octo-
ber of 1981 without receiving any referral to the TDC program.
Had Weaver's child-care expenses been deducted from her $500 per
month income, she would have remained eligible for AFDC and
Medicaid.58
Like Simpson and Brooks, Berberena and Weaver also sought
to bring their suit as a class action. The Berberena class was defined
to include denied AFDC applicants and cancelled recipients-while
54. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint Sept. 23, 1981).
55. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981).
56. Id. at 6-8, 10-11.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 8-9, 10-11.
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Simpson included only current AFDC recipients. The Berberena
case challenged the failure to count child-care expenses in determin-
ing AFDC eligibility (which automatically conferred Medicaid eligi-
bility), while the Simpson suit focused on the failure to count these
expenses in determining the amount of the AFDC grant. The
Berberena class, as finally certified on May 14, 1982, was defined
as:
All applicants for and recipients of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC), on or after February, 1979, (1) 'who
would be or would have been eligible for AFDC benefits if their
work-related child-care expenses (in a reasonable amount prior
to October 1, 1981, and in an amount not exceeding $160.00
per child per month as of October 1, 1981) were deducted from
their income but (2) whom the Illinois Department of Public
Aid has found, or will find, ineligible (by denying their applica-
tions or terminating their benefits) without first promptly pay-
ing or assuring prompt payment of plaintiffs' child-care ex-
penses in a reasonable amount prior to October 1, 1981 and in
an amount not exceeding $160 per child per month as of Octo-
ber 1, 1981.11
Because the Berberena case involved the adequacy of the TDC pro-
gram as a substitute for the child-care disregard, the Director of
DCFS was joined as a defendant along with the Director of the
IDPA. 0' Upon filing suit, Berberena and Weaver sought prelimi-
nary injunctive relief, which they obtained by an agreement with
IDPA on October 23, 1981.61 The agreement provided that IDPA
would pay the full amount of their child-care expenses pending fur-
ther litigation.6 2
59. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1982) (class certification).
60. Two suits instead of one were filed for several reasons. The principal reason was
that the plaintiffs feared that Williams v. Quern, No. 77-4218, slip op. (N.D. 11. Nov. 14,
1977), might bar the claims of applicants and cancelled recipients. For that reason, they lim-
ited the Simpson case to persons who were not class members in Williams-i.e. current recipi-
ents. Other reasons were that an additional defendant, DCFS, was included in Berberena; the
adequacy of the TDC remedy was in issue only in the Berberena case; and the measure of
damages in the two cases was different. The plaintiffs might have moved to relate Berberena
and Simpson had the judge in Simpson not been recuperating from surgery at the time Berber-
ena was filed. The defendants eventually moved to relate the two cases, but by that time, the
Simpson court was ready to rule, while discovery was still pending in Berberena.
61. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction).
62. Id.
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B. Proceedings Prior to Judgment-Simpson
The first briefing in the Simpson suit concerned class certifica-
tion. Because as many as 32,000 people were members of the Simp-
son class, there was no doubt that the plaintiffs met the "numer-
osity" requirement for class certification.6" Following the passage of
the OBRA, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to reflect the
OBRA changes. Thereafter, the defendants sought to challenge class
certification by excluding from the class persons whose claim for
child-care deductions ended prior to October 1, 1981. The defen-
dants argued that the OBRA made moot such claims for injunctive
relief, and thus the class should not include persons with moot
claims.64
On this issue of first impression, the court certified the entire
Simpson class on February 16, 1982.65 The court reasoned that per-
sons whose claims arose prior to October 1, 1981, retained an adver-
sarial and concrete interest in obtaining notice of their administrative
remedies to pursue retroactive benefit claims. Thus, even though
these persons had no interest in injunctive relief, their claim for some
relief was not moot.
With the passage of the OBRA, AFDC eligibility for many
Simpson class members would be lost in January, 1982. Four
months from the effective date of the new law, the AFDC grants of
thousands of Simpson class members would be cancelled when their
work-incentive disregard was no longer allowed. While the Simpson
plaintiffs did not and could not claim that the loss of the work-incen-
tive disregard was illegal, the loss of the disregard, coupled with the
illegal failure to count their child-care expenses, threatened them
with irreparable harm. To avert the impending loss of AFDC bene-
fits for thousands of class members, in mid-January the Simpson
plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunctive relief.66
This relief was denied on February 11, 1982.67 The court rea-
63. This estimate is based on projected statistics concerning the number of working
AFDC recipients in Illinois in 1980 (38,607), less the number who received full reimburse-
ment for licensed center care (5,809). See Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540, 542 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (class certified). The estimates were found adequate for class certification.
64. A similar issue arose in Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1984). In
Banas, however, the state began complying with OBRA, thus mooting the class' claim for any
injunctive relief. The court did not find that the class was moot, but found that no relief could
be granted because notice relief could only be issued if it were ancillary to injunctive relief.
65. Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
66. Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. I1. 1982) motion for preliminary
injunction).
67. Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. Il1. 1982) (order denying preliminary
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soned that because the principal cause of injury was the loss of the
work-incentive disregard, which was not challenged, preliminary in-
junctive relief was inappropriate. As a compromise in plaintiffs'
favor, and possibly in recognition of the strength of their challenge to
the denial of child-care deductions, the court asked the parties to file
cross motions for summary judgment and it set an expedited briefing
schedule on these motions."8
On March 17, 1982, the court granted summary judgment to
the Simpson plaintiffs on every claim. 9 On March 19, 1982, an in-
junction order required the IDPA to immediately begin deducting
child-care expenses in order to compute AFDC grants.70 The Simp-
son summary judgment decision represents the first federal decision
on the child-care deduction requirement of the OBRA and one of a
handful of federal decisions that interpreted pre-OBRA work-ex-
pense law as applied to child-care expenses.
71
The most highly controverted issue in the case and probably the
most significant portion of the court's ruling concerned whether the
child-care deduction was available to recipients who used unlicensed
child care. The defendant argued against allowing such deductions in
order to promote the legitimate state interests to protect the health
and safety of children.72 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued
that the Social Security Act did not restrict the deduction solely to
licensed care or care which was exempt from licensing requirements.
The court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, and held that the licensing
restriction acted as a disincentive to work, thus violating the purpose
of the Social Security Act deduction provision.7 ' The court also
found that the licensing requirement penalized needy children by de-
nying them assistance for reasons outside their control.
74
A final judgment order was entered in Simpson on May 12,
1982 .7 This order provided for notice to all class members of their
rights to pursue state administrative remedies to obtain retroactive
injunction).
68. Id.
69. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Il. 1982).
70. Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (preliminary injunction).
71. For other federal decisions interpreting pre-OBRA work-expense law, see cases
cited supra notes 3 and 21.
72. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (defendant's memorandum
in opposition to preliminary injunctive relief) (defendant's memorandum in opposition to sum-
mary judgment).
73. 535 F. Supp. 1041 at 1048, 1050.
74. Id. at 1050.
75. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (final judgment order).
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child-care benefits."6 Furthermore, the judgment declared illegal the
defendant's failure to deduct work-related child-care expenses in
computing AFDC grants and it enjoined future denials of such
deductions.
C. Proceedings Prior to Judgment: Berberena
While the Simpson class sought preliminary injunctive relief,
the Berberena class made a similar motion." The court in Berber-
ena followed the lead of the court in Simpson. First, the court denied
the motion, and then it set an expedited briefing schedule on cross
motions for summary judgment. 8 The Berberena plaintiffs had not
completed their discovery concerning the adequacy of the TDC pro-
gram as a substitute for the disregard, however, and for that reason,
the summary judgment briefing schedule was later extended.7 9
Meanwhile, the court in Simpson issued its summary judgement
decision.
Despite the complete victory for the plaintiffs in the Simpson
suit, the defendants made no effort following the Simpson ruling to
settle the Berberena case. Although the IDPA stopped TDC pro-
gram referrals on April 2, 1982, the IDPA did not take steps to
amend its child-care deduction policies for AFDC applicants and
cancelled recipients. After the defendants stipulated that the Berber-
ena case could proceed as a class action,8 ° both sides went forward
with summary judgment briefing. Only after all the briefs were filed
did the parties reach an agreement. The consent decree was entered
on August 27, 1982-more than six months after the Simpson rul-
76. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution precludes federal courts from ordering states to
pay retroactive damages. Edelman, like Simpson was a Legal Assistance Foundation of Chi-
cago suit against the IDPA Director. After this ruling in Edelman, the plaintiffs there sought
an order requiring the state agency director to notify class members that they could use state
administrative procedures to obtain retroactive benefits. The issue of whether this notice relief
was permissible was raised before the U.S. Supreme Court inJordan H1. The Supreme Court
held that such notice relief was "prospective" and "ancillary" to injunctive relief and hence
permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
77. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981) (minute order
Jan. 21, 1982).
78. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1981) (minute order
Feb. 11, 1982).
79. Berberena V. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981) (minute order
May 4, 1982).
80. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981) (class certifica-
tion). See supra note 45 for class statistics.
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ing.81 The decree came after strong urging by the court. The court
supplied a key paragraph which compelled the defendants to either
settle or face another summary judgment ruling: "The parties agree
that the ruling on the merits in Simpson v. Miller governs all defen-
dants' duties and plaintiffs' rights in this case."'82 While the meaning
of this paragraph was somewhat cryptic to the plaintiffs, it did indi-
cate that the state's denial of child-care deductions was illegal. The
Berberena decree, like the Simpson judgment order, provided for no-
tice to class members of their administrative remedies and enjoined
future violations of the child-care deduction provisions of the Social
Security Act.88
D. Post-Judgment Issues
In litigation, judgment orders and consent decrees often mark
only the beginning of further litigation, not the end. Similarly, in
both Simpson and Berberena, two years of additional litigation fol-
lowed the entry of the final order and consent decree.
Compliance with the Berberena decree became an issue shortly
after it was entered. First, the IDPA failed to promulgate new court-
ordered rules to implement the child-care deduction. On November
23, 1982, the plaintiffs moved for a contempt ruling.84 On December
14, 1982, the court ordered the defendants to promulgate particular
policies to comply with the consent decree.86 In addition, the court
awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees for successfully prosecuting
their enforcement claim.
The second compliance issue in Berberena raised more serious
problems. Day-care lobbyists in Illinois had fought successfully for a
seven million dollar appropriation to the TDC program in Illinois.
With the TDC program abolished by virtue of the Berberena con-
sent decree, these day-care lobbyists, as well as IDPA and DCFS,
were eager to reinstate some version of the TDC program so that the
appropriate funds would still be used for child care.
On December 8, 1982, IDPA announced its intention to rein-
state a new version of the TDC program.86 Under this new pro-
81. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. II1. Oct. 15, 1981) (consent
decree).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1981) (plaintiff's
motion for a rule to show cause Nov. 23, 1982).
85. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1981) (order).
86. Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1981) (plaintiffs'
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gram, AFDC applicants and recipients whose child-care expenses
were higher than their AFDC grant would be offered the choice of
enrollment in TDC instead of continuing to receive AFDC.87 Thus,
a recipient whose child-care expenses were $150 per month, while
her AFDC grant (after deducting her child-care expenses) was only
$20 per month, might well prefer to have her child-care expenses
paid even though she would lose AFDC and Medicaid benefits.
The Berberena plaintiffs objected to the manner in which
IDPA sought to reinstate the program, however. The notices that the
IDPA intended to use to explain the program did not fully explain
the benefits which TDC participants would lose-including Medi-
caid coverage. Additionally, after IDPA agreed to modify its notices
to meet the plaintiffs' objections, it proceeded to adopt other notices
to which the plaintiffs had never agreed. For that reason, the Berber-
ena plaintiffs again moved for a contempt ruling.8 After negotia-
tions, a more balanced notice was developed which fully explained
the choice between TDC and AFDC. Interestingly, the IDPA dis-
continued the new TDC program after only a few months because
very few AFDC recipients chose to participate.
In both Simpson and Berberena, the most time-consuming is-
sues after judgment have involved the retroactive benefit claims of
thousands of class members. After sending notice and claim forms to
class members of their right to pursue their state administrative rem-
edies, the IDPA received about 4,200 claims from Simpson class
members and 3,900 claims from Berberena class members.89 The
IDPA then took no further action regarding these claims; it failed to
process the claims or to set any administrative hearings in order for
class members to prove their entitlement to retroactive relief.
On January 6, 1983, the Simpson plaintiffs returned to federal
court to ask that the defendant be ordered to process class members'
claims.90 As briefing on this motion was pending, the defendant then
motion for a rule to show cause, June 21, 1983).
87. Id.
88. Id. at Exh. 2.
89. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (defendant's report to the
court Oct. 29, 1982); Berberena v. Miller, No. 81-5776, slip op. (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1981)
(defendant's report to the court Feb. 1, 1983).
90. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. III. 1982) (plaintiff's motion for en-
forcement of final judgment order Jan. 20, 1983). It remains an open question whether a
federal court can order a state agency to dispose of retroactive benefit claims in a particular
manner, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. Federal regulations at 45 C.F.R. §
205.10(a)(16) (1980) require states to hold administrative hearings concerning AFDC benefits
within 90 days of the request. The defendants in Simpson argued, however, that this regula-
tion did not apply to administrative hearings following class-wide notice relief.
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began to process the claims and the motion in federal court was
therefore withdrawn. Pursuant to these procedures, the IDPA found
540 persons eligible for a total of $590,000 in retroactive benefits.91
Nonetheless, the IDPA refused to pay these retroactive benefits.
It insisted instead that the plaintiffs file yet another suit in the Illi-
nois Court of Claims.9" IDPA sought to force the plaintiffs into the
Court of Claims in order to avoid paying the benefits out of current
IDPA appropriations.9" While the plaintiffs had no objection to us-
ing the Court of Claims judgment fund as a source of payment, they
did fear that their claim might be denied by the Court of Claims,
and that they would then have no judicial recourse.94 Therefore,
plaintiffs filed two actions to recover their retroactive benefits: one
action was filed in the trial court which normally reviews adminis-
trative agency decisions, and one action was filed in the Illinois
Court of Claims.9" After the trial court action was dismissed and a
notice of appeal filed, the Court of Claims awarded judgment to the
plaintiffs.96 Approximately $400,000 in retroactive child-care bene-
fits were finally paid to Simpson class members on December 24,
1983.
The procedures used to compute Berberena retroactive benefits
are far more complex than the procedures used to compute Simpson
benefits. In Simpson, the measure of damages was the amount of
child-care expenses not deducted, with a monthly ceiling of $160 per
child for each claim month after October 1, 1981. In Berberena, the
measure of damages was the amount of AFDC benefits (and argua-
bly Medicaid benefits) the family would have received if the state
had deducted child-care expenses.98 To properly compute Berberena
damages, a full AFDC grant computation must be performed for
91. Harris v. IDPA, No. 83-51369, slip op. (filed June 3, 1983).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Court of Claims is not really a court, but an arm of the legislature. No appeals
are allowed from Court of Claims decisions in Illinois. Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 IIl.
2d 109, 355 N.E. 2d 537 (1976).
95. Harris v. IDPA, 83 L 51369, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1983); Harris v. State of
Illinois, 83 Il1. Ct. Cl. 2856 (1983).
96. Harris v. State of Illinois, 83 I1. Ct. Cl. 2586 (1983) (awarding Harris claimants
$590,634.52).
97. This sum is less than the sum allocated because some claimants could not be located
and checks had to be reprocessed because of address changes.
98. Additional suits were filed in state court to recover retroactive benefits for persons
initially found ineligible. Applewhite v. IDPA, 83 L 53110 (86 class members); Bingham v.
IDPA, 84 CC 1836 (17 class members).
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each month the class member would have been AFDC-eligible.""
Due to the administrative difficulties in performing such calcula-
tions, the IDPA has been slower to act on Berberena claims than
Simpson claims. In fact, the IDPA took no action on Berberena
claims until November 7, 1983, when it sent each Berberena claim-
ant an additional screening form so than an average entitlement
could be constructed. To date, however, IDPA has not issued a final
administrative decision granting retroactive benefits to any Berber-
ena class member.
V. THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN AFDC CHILD-CARE REFORM
By all measures, the federal Simpson and Berberena suits were
remarkably successful." ° As a result of the litigation, thousands of
working AFDC recipients continued to be eligible for AFDC; state
policies restricting child-care reimbursements were enjoined; and ret-
roactive benefits of close to half a million dollars were paid to work-
ing poor families.""° Similarly, suits in other states have stopped the
illegal practice of failing to deduct child-care expenses to determine
AFDC eligibility and grant amounts.1 02
Despite the victory for the plaintiffs in Simpson and Berberena,
however, the defendants profited more by violating the law than they
lost by losing the suits. For each year that it failed to recognize
child-care expenses, the state saved many millions of dollars in
AFDC benefits and Medicaid.103 And while the state compensated
hundreds of class members by making retroactive benefit awards, the
state also profited by the disappearance of many class members. 104
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A) (1982) confers Medicaid eligibility to AFDC-eligible
persons. Because the calculations change on October 1, 1981 with OBRA, and again four
months after each claimant loses the "30 plus one third" disregard, they can be very time
consuming.
100. The Seventh Circuit found the results "significant" in affirming the plaintiffs' full
request for attorney's fees. Berberena v. Coler, 84-1458 (filed January 1, 1985).
101. The benefit to the Berberena class alone was estimated at about $4.8 million annu-
ally. Id.
102. See supra notes 3 and 21.
103. The state paid only about a half million in damages, while the costs of compliance
at the higher 1980-81 caseloads would have been more than the $4.8 million annual cost of
compliance with Berberena, supra note 100.
104. Many class members did not pursue their claims because they had difficulty in
obtaining all the information they needed in order to make a claim. Some encountered difficul-
ties in locating former babysitters or persuading babysitters to write out a statement to verify
their child-care expenses. Others had difficulty verifying earnings and remembering their
AFDC eligibility determination dates. Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to streamline the claims
process by holding a series of training sessions for class members interested in filing claims.
Nonetheless, even those who attended these sessions frequently experienced difficulties in com-
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The loss of AFDC benefits caused by the state's illegal denial of
child-care deductions, therefore, has not been and will not be suffi-
ciently recompensed.
Class action litigation like Simpson and Berberena, though nec-
essary to compel compliance by recalcitrant state welfare agencies, is
inherently limited as a means to insure adequate recognition of the
child-care needs of working poor people. First, these suits merely
seek to enforce the law, not to change it. Thus, when the OBRA
instituted a cap of $160 per child per month on child-care expenses,
the Simpson and Berberena plaintiffs had to restrict their entitle-
ment claims to this statutory limit, no matter how inadequate that
maximum might actually be. For recipients using licensed center
care, these maximums may be inadequate per se, if the state had
previously paid a greater amount (as was the case in Illinois). Legis-
lation amending the child-care caps and restoring the deduction for
all reasonable work-related child-care expenses is needed to recog-
nize the full amount of AFDC applicants' and recipients' needs.
A second limitation of the child-care disregard as a child-care
funding mechanism is that it requires recipients to first incur child-
care expenses before any expenses are recognized. For poor recipi-
ents, this restriction sometimes prevents a parent from choosing ade-
quate day-care and sometimes bars full reimbursement of child-care
costs. For day-care providers, this method can introduce cash flow
problems when the recipients do not have adequate cash on hand to
pay for their services.
Finally, the work-expense deduction method does not ade-
quately serve the full AFDC population. With the OBRA's restric-
tions on the work-incentive disregard, fewer AFDC recipients reap
any financial benefit from working. A smaller percentage of AFDC
recipients work now than did in 1980.105 The deduction remains
wholly unavailable for care needed while the parent is enrolled in
school or training to obtain employment. These limitations, unfortu-
nately, cannot be remedied by litigation over the work-related child-
care disregard.
AFDC applicants and recipients will only be encouraged to
work if they can profit from their labor. Legislation to restore the
pleting their claims.
105. The defendants in Simpson reported 5,632 AFDC earned income cases in Septem-
ber, 1982. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. II1. 1982) (defendant's report to the
Court Oct. 27, 1982). The number of earned income cases in November, 1980, by contrast was
over 12,000. Letter from Karl Peipenburg, IDPA Office of Public Information, to Rhonda
Cassady, Clerk, Women's Law Project (December 23, 1980).
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full work-incentive disregard and to allow deduction of all reasona-
ble work-expenses, including child care, is the only long-term solu-
tion to this work-disincentive problem the OBRA has created. The
expenses of child care must be recognized and fully reimbursed in
order to enable poor parents to leave the welfare roles. Litigation
such as Simpson and Berberena can only enforce the legal rights
Congress confers on the working poor. These rights can be expanded
only by increased congressional awareness of the importance of child
care for the working AFDC recipient.
